Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

The Republic of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes to Washington
William H. Simon
Columbia Law School, wsimon@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
William H. Simon, The Republic of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes to Washington, 38(4) BOSTON REV. 46
(2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1811

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

BOOKS & IDEAS

,,I

- i�

l!f
If

THE REPUBLIC OF
CHOOSING

A BEHAVIORIST
GOES TO
WASHINGTON
William H. Simon
Simpler: The Future of Government
Cass R. Sunstein
Simon & Schuster, $26 (cloth)

C

ASS SUNSTEIN WENT TO WASHING

ton with the aim of putting some
theory into practice. As administrator
of the Office of Information and Regu
latory Affairs (OIRA) during President
Obama's first term, he drew on the be
havioral economics he helped develop
as an academic. In his new book, Sim
pler, he reports on these efforts and
elaborates a larger vision in which they
exemplify "the future of government."
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Sunstein's approach is inspired by a
famous body of survey and laboratory
research suggesting that individual
decision-making is often irrational. For
example, in surveys people express a
willingness to pay more for insurance
that covers injuries from terrorism
than for insurance that covers injuries
full stop, although logically the latter
must be more valuable. This tendency
appears to be a manifestation of "the
availability heuristic": mention of ter
rorism summons up more vivid im
agery than mention of injury in the
abstract. In the laboratory, when ex
perimenters give subjects a mug and
ask them how much they would sell it
for, the subjects tend to demand con
siderably more than they offer to pay
for the same mug when, instead of giv
ing them the mug, the experimenters
give them cash and an opportunity to
buy it-an "endowment effect." And
many people who choose the one
ounce piece of chocolate when offered
a choice between one- and two-ounce
pieces choose the two-ounce piece

when they also have a three-ounce op
tion. It's easier to choose the two-ounce
piece when it is the middle choice-a
"framing effect." In general, the behav
iorists find that people have strong
tendencies to drift with the status quo
rather than opt for change, to succumb
unreflectively to rhetoric and imagery,
and to excessively discount the future.
Such findings challenge libertarian
and economistic accounts that portray
individual choices as virtually always
rational, or at least as only occasion
ally and unpredictably irrational. The
behaviorists suggest that irrationality
is both routine and predictable. Sun
stein, a long-time defender of liberal
politics, sees this research as support
ing government intervention into
private economic arrangements. Yet
he has also absorbed the critiques of
New-Deal-style bureaucracy, which
insist that it does not follow from the
fact that individuals choose sub-opti
mally that government can do better.
Although the government may know
that choices are biased in a particular
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direction, it may not be able to deter
mine reliably whether that direction is
contrary to the interests of the choos
ers. Some of the choices in the behav
iorist studies, such as paying more
for insurance with less coverage, are
clearly against the choosers' interests.
But often, as with the chocolates, we
cannot be sure, even after identifying
cognitive bias, what the best choice is.
Sunstein's contribution is to elaborate
intermediate interventions that pro
tect against unconscious bias without
categorically preempting choice.
Simpler reports some notable
achievements, but it exaggerates the
practical value of the behaviorist tool
kit. The Obama administration's most
important policy initiatives make only
minor use of it. Despite its upbeat tone,
the book implies an oddly constrained
conception of the means and ends
of government. It sometimes calls to
mind a doctor putting on a cheerful
face to say that, while there is little he
can do to arrest the disease, he will try
to make the patient as comfortable as
possible.

THE BOOK RECOUNTS a variety

of Obama administration efforts to
make government more transparent
and user-friendly. These efforts have
improved access to aggregate govern
ment data, enabled citizens to locate
more of the specific data government
has collected about them, provided
clearer accounts of government activ
ity, enhanced the intelligibility of gov
ernment regulations and applications,
and distributed helpful guidance on
matters ranging from nutrition to en
ergy efficiency.
These reforms are admirable, but
there is nothing novel about them in
principle, and they have been influ
enced only peripherally by behavioral
research. The initiatives most identi
fied with behavioral research involve
what Sunstein calls "nudges." A nudge
seeks to influence choices by calibrat
ing the way they are presented.
There are two types of nudges. The
first concerns disclosure. The governBOSTONREVIEW.NET

ment can require sellers to more sa
liently and clearly communicate key
factors the consumer might otherwise
overlook or misunderstand. So, as a
condition of government-backed loans
to their students, vocational schools
must prominently disclose to appli
cants their graduation rates and the
employment rates of their graduates.
Airlines must quote prices inclusive
of airport fees and taxes. Auto deal
ers must report "annual fuel cost" as
prominently as the less informative
"miles per gallon."
The second type of nudge involves
changing the default rule-the rule
that dictates what happens if the indi
vidual does not make a relevant choice.
The most famous example concerns
employer-sponsored retirement sav
ings plans. The traditional default rule
is that if the employee fails to enroll,
she does not participate; the employer
does not divert part of her pay to a tax
advantaged savings account. But be
havioral science teaches-if we didn't
know it already-that people have bi
ases in favor of the status quo and that
they tend to over-discount their future
needs. People who don't save run a
high risk of financial distress in re
tirement and are likely to regret their
prior choices. So it makes more sense
for the default rule to be automatic
enrollment. If the employee does not
want to save, she can take initiative
to opt out, but if she drifts instead of
choosing, the default rule leads her to
save. Sunstein reports proudly that re
cent regulations encourage employers
to shift from the traditional opt-in de
sign to an opt-out one.
To Sunstein, nudges have two sorts
of advantages over mandatory regula
tion. First, they constrain liberty less.
A mandatory rule might deny gov
ernment-backed loans for tuition at
schools with low graduation rates or
force participation in employer-spon
sored retirement programs. A nudge
leaves choice open. To be sure, the
nudge represents an exercise of gov
ernment power on the basis of official
judgments about people's interests,

but that power is exercised weakly
and the judgments are more tentative
than a mandatory rule would require.
If nudges are paternalistic, they are
"soft" paternalism rather than the hard
paternalism of mandatory rules.
Second, effective nudges demand
less government information than ef
fective mandatory rules. A nudging
government still needs some basis for
deciding what direction to nudge in,
but as long as individuals are free to
push back, they can escape the effect
of the government's mistakes if they
care enough to make an effort. More
over, nudges permit individuals to act
on particular tastes or take account of
unusual circumstances in a way that
a uniform rule would not. Even if it is
in the interests of employees generally

Sunstein's vision calls to
mind a doctor with a
cheerful face saying
there's little he can do.
to save more, certain employees may
have good reasons for not doing so
at a given moment. Maybe they have
extraordinary medical bills or need a
down payment for a house. A regula
tor writing a mandatory rule could not
factor in such varying circumstances,
but a nudge does tl1e trick.

YET, WHILE SUNSTEIN gives many

examples of plausible nudges, most of
them, like the retirement-plan default,
seem to have fairly modest impacts.
Only 20 percent of the income of el
derly retirees comes from pension
funds; most of the rest comes from the
traditional hard-paternalist Social Se
curity program. You can get an idea of
how limited the domain of the behav
iorist tools is by surveying the Obama
administration's most ambitious doJULY / AUGUST 2013
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mestic initiatives: the Food Safety
Modernization Act, the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. Obamacare), and Race to the Top and related
education initiatives. Nudges do not
play central roles in any of them.
Choice architecture plays no role in
the food safety statute. The law could
have created a rating system that
advised consumers of the probability that food from a given processor
would make them sick, while permitting processors to market and consumers to purchase low-rated products.
(Some cities do something like that
with restaurant sanitation regulation.)
Instead, the law demands a high degree of safety from all processors and
prohibits those who do not meet it
from operating. On Sunstein's criteria,
there is no need for halfway measures
because the government understanding of consumer interests is strong
and there is little variation in relevant
tastes.

ity to identify relatively healthy people
rather than on the quality of their service. If the Medicare cost controls work,
they will necessarily narrow choices
of drugs and services. And the statute
encourages states to restrict the rates
insurers can charge. Rate regulation
arises from fear that insurance markets
will become oligopolistic. Disclosure is
no antidote for monopoly power
Dodd-Frank has a bigger role for
choice architecture than do the other
initiatives. It creates a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate consumer credit contracts, and
no doubt much of the regulation will
address disclosure and default matters. But the law is also likely to lead
to choice-limiting prohibitions of abusive contract terms. More importantly,
Dodd-Frank is primarily an effort to

Sunstein mentions in passing that
choice-architecture tools will be useful
in implementing the Affordable Care
Act, and indeed the statute is chock
full of nudges, including a requirement of automatic enrollment in employer health plans and a directive to
the Food and Drug Administration to
study standardized disclosure of risks
and benefits of prescription drugs.
In any event, the choice-enhancing
features of the statute seem considerably less important than the features
of the bill that are designed to narrow
choice. Consumers no longer have the
choice to remain uninsured. This mandate reflects in part a hard paternalist
belief that few people could rationally
choose not to insure, as well as concerns about adverse selection—the
tendency of relatively healthy people
to undermine risk pooling by opting
out. Providers have less choice about
which applicants they can reject. They
can't reject any on the basis of preexisting conditions, otherwise they
would "cream"—compete on their abil-

of limited use.
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For pressing Initiatives,
the hehaviorist toolkit is

avoid further financial system crises,
and irrational consumer choices are
not the major source of risk here. The
most important causes of the recent crisis involved the externalization of risk
by borrowers and lenders, ultimately
to the federal government through its
deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort,
and too-big-to-fail bailout practices.
Many risk-creating transactions, including consumer "liar loans" and nodown-payment deals, were rational for
the immediate parties. No amount of
choice structuring in connection with
a decision can reliably prevent harm
that will occur to someone other than
the decision-maker Thus, the central
thrust of Dodd-Frank is to constrain
risk-taking by restrictingfinancialinstitutions' choices about such matters as
proprietary trading and capital levels.
Finally, Race to the Top also has a
choice feature. As a condition of eli-

gibility for the relevant grants, states
must make some provision for charter
schools. Yet the charter school requirements are very weak. The main thrust
of the administration's education initiatives is to induce states to adopt standards, data systems, diagnostic tests,
and remedial interventions that permit
schools to engage in continuous reassessment and adaptation of teaching
practices—what the regulations call
"instructional improvement systems."
THE OBVERSE OF Sunstein's preoccupation with choice architecture is
his relative indifference to other approaches to making administration
less rigid. Recall that among the problems Sunstein sees with conventional
regulation are, first, that it mandates
conduct in situations where the regulator doesn't know with confidence
what is the right thing to do, and second, that it is insufficiently sensitive
to relevant local variations in taste or
circumstances.
The most common way to deal with
the first problem—insufficient information—is to build learning into the
process of intervention: the regulator
intervenes provisionally, studies the
effects of her intervention, and adapts
as she learns. It is commonplace for
statutes to mandate or fund demonstration or pilot projects. More importantly, statutes often demand that both
top administrators and frontline workers reassess and adjust their practices
continuously. This approach is the
central and explicit thrust of Race to
the Top's "instructional improvement
systems," and it recurs prominently in
all the statutes mentioned so far
These statutes also strive to accommodate local variation. Increasingly,
regulation leaves regulated actors discretion over practices as long as they
achieve minimally adequate measurable results. Thus, for example, the
Food Safety Modernization Act does
not mandate that the Food and Drug
Administration prescribe how processing plants should operate. Rather,
it provides that each processor formu-

BOOKS

late its own safety plan and that the
FDA then measure the efficacy of the
facility's efforts against a set of indicators. Moreover, the U.S. federal structure is significantly responsive to the
demands of learning and context. All
four initiatives pay homage to the idea
of states as "laboratories of democracy" by giving them significant roles,
according them broad discretion as to
how to perform them, and encouraging peer exchanges or central aggregation of information in ways that promote learning.
Sunstein knows all this and occasionally refers in the book to nonnudge forms of regulatory loosening,
but they are not central for him. Why
not? I can think of three reasons.
First, Sunstein seems overly impressed by methodological rigor. The
studies that have influenced him have
the glamor of scientific form and the
force of controlled empiricism. But
rigorous control comes at a cost. It is
impossible in some circumstances and
expensive in most others, and results
are often ambiguous. Small changes
in the intervention studied might
have produced very different results,
and the experimental measures may
not capture all the important effects.
Drug regulation is the field in which
rigorous empiricism has played the
most central role, but even here recent legislation has loosened requirements because of concerns that they
excessively delay or increase the cost
of new therapies. Elsewhere, it is often more productive to have people
with diverse perspectives and knowledge pool information informally. The
most common form of empiricism in
most policy contexts is peer review, in
which knowledgeable people address
problems or assess data deliberatively.
In the business world, it is routine to
re assess strategy continuously in the
light of whatever data is available
without the benefit of formal empirical study. (Steve Jobs, whose commitment to "user-friendly" products Sunstein invokes, famously disdained
market research.)
BOSTONREVIEW.NET
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Second, Sunstein, both as a teacher Sunstein argues convincingly that
of administrative law and an OIRA of
cost-benefit analysis has no antificial, has been immersed throughout regulatory bias in principle and is
his career in an anachronistic model a helpful inducement to clarity and
of administrative government. The disciplined analysis. Nevertheless, the
model was developed in the aftermath process remains heavily front-loaded.
of the New Deal. It combines the New Efficacy must be rigorously demonDeal understanding of administration strated when a regulation is proposed,
as a matter of rigid and stable regula- but there is little pressure to reassess
tions with the conservative suspicion once it is in place. This process is
of government initiative. The model poorly adapted to situations, such as
was thus designed to make it difficult those that prompted the four initiato promulgate regulations, but it also tives mentioned above, where there is
can make it difficult to change them strong uncertainty about the nature of
or at least easy to leave them in place. a problem or its solution. For example,
OIRA review is just one stage in the because bankers constantly find new
promulgation process, which often ways to transact around regulatory
takes many years. Recent administra- constraints, no rule can anticipate
tions have thickened OIRA's role by re- all the risky moves that should be
quiring that agencies show that a pro- banned. What's needed is a rule that
posed regulation's benefits exceed its mandates ongoing disclosure, review,
costs. In Republican administrations, and adaptation. Assessments of the efOIRA has often stalled or strangled ficacy of such a rule will be most valuregulations by making implausible able after it has been implemented.
demands for methodological rigor or
To its credit, the Obama adminisbiased estimates of costs and benefits. tration, under Sunstein's influence.
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showed some awareness of the frontloading problem when it encouraged
agencies to review already-promulgated rules. But the review duty is
vague and discretionary. The duty of
upfront cost-benefit analysis is detailed and categorical. Sunstein's preoccupation with choice as a response
to uncertainty seems to reflect an assumption that administrative practice has limited capacity to learn and
adapt. In fact, however, the process of
regulatory enactment he oversaw is
partly responsible for this limitation.
Third, the modes of adaptation that
Sunstein slights tend to employ collaborative decision-making. In one example that can be found in contexts as
disparate as nuclear power regulation
and child protective services, frontline
workers are expected to depart from
the rules when following them would
not serve their purposes. But when
they depart, they must trigger a review
in which their actions are assessed by
peers and supervisors. When the departures are sustained, the rules are
rewritten to reflect the enhanced understanding. Decisions at all levels of
the process involve deliberation by
groups, often interdisciplinary ones.
It is not clear what Sunstein thinks
about such processes. Simpler is focused on individual decision-making.
Sunstein sees individual decisionmaking as prone to error but also as
corrigible with the help of behaviorist
learning. He says nothing here about
the psychology of group decision-making. Elsewhere, however, he has written of it with skepticism. In particular,
he has explored the pathologies of
"group polarization"—the tendency of
deliberators to become more extreme
in their views when they deliberate
with like-minded others—and "groupthink"—the tendency of deliberators
to repress or shape their views to conform to what they sense, sometimes
inaccurately, is the dominant tendency
in the group.
Sunstein's discussion of the challenges of group decision-making does
not have the meliorist tone he adopts
50
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with respect to individual decisionmaking. Yet there is a social science literature suggesting that the problems
of group decision-making are also
treatable. For example, disinterested
conveners or facilitators can improve
deliberation by inducing presentation
of balanced information and eliciting a
full range of views. This literature also
suggests that group decision-making
can mitigate some of the pathologies
the behaviorists find in individual decision-making. For example, the need
of each group member to articulate
and explain her position to the others
forces self-consciousness that disrupts
reliance on the unreflective thought
patterns the bebaviorists document.
THE NUOGE APPROADH is influ-

enced by ideological strategy as well
as by social science. Sunstein seems to
think that for liberalism to reclaim the
support it has lost in recent decades
the key task is to find common ground
with the libertarian right. Hence he
emphasizes the liberty-respecting dimension of choice-architecture regulation. A good part of the book engages
libertarian critiques of government
respectfully, indeed timidly. Sunstein
also shares the libertarian focus on the
danger of excessive, as opposed to insufficient, regulation. At OIRA, he enthusiastically implemented President
Obama's directive that agencies seek
to identify "unnecessary" regulations
for repeal or cutback, acknowledging only as an afterthought that there
might be some regulations that should
be strengthened.
Although Sunstein seems unchastened by it, there is evidence in his
book that the ideological strategy is
a failure. Libertarians have not been
placated. Thirty-four Republican Senators voted against Sunstein's confirmation. In a series of television rants,
Glenn Beck portrayed Sunstein as "the
most dangerous man in America," attacking nudges as an insidious form of
covert control. The economist Edward
Glaeser made the same argument with
less hyperbole: fiddling with choice

architecture is more dangerous than
enacting mandatory rules because the
interventions are less noticeable and
hence less likely to trigger political opposition.
Sunstein's strategy misconceives
where liberals should be looking for
allies and what they need to do to win
them. They should be looking in the
center, not on the fringe, and the key
to winning centrist support for liberal
economic programs is to demonstrate
their capacity to deal effectively with
public problems, not to increase their
accommodation of individual choice.
Most Americans are not strong libertarians in economic matters. They do
not see the capacity to choose among
health insurance plans or to buy taxfree cigarettes as matters of liberty in
any sense akin to rights of free speech,
due process, political participation,
or (for some) gun possession. They
see choice in the economic domain
largely in utilitarian terms. If regimes
that allow choice leave most people
better off, they are good. But choice
should be readily sacrificed when doing so leads to more efficient provision of services.
Consider that the situation in current public discourse is virtually the
opposite of that portrayed by Glaeser. Minor, indirect efforts to influence choices, such as Mayor Michael
Bloomberg's restriction on soda servings, often generate noisy debate
about whether their trivial restraints
on liberty can be justified. Because
libertarian rhetoric is a kind of background music in American culture, debates about paternalism have a certain
entertainment value. Yet massive and
directly coercive programs are rarely
attacked as infringements of liberty
and are often taken for granted. Social
Security is the standout example, but
there are many others, including Medicare, unemployment insurance, workplace safety, securities regulation, and
defective-product regulation. All these
programs rest in substantial part on
hard paternalist rationales. Yet when
they are criticized, they are usually
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charged with ineffectiveness, not with
infringing liberty. Even the right rarely
attacks Social Security as paternalist
anymore. Its complaints mainly as
sert that the program is inadequately
funded and unlikely to deliver prom
ised benefits. Social Security's defend
ers spend most of their time showing
that the program is sound or can be
made so with modest reforms, not try
ing to make the program more palat
able to libertarians.
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The biggest current liability for lib
erals is that many people have lost faith
in the capacity of government to solve
the problems they care about. Perhaps
the most prominent of these problems
are unemployment, economic inequal
ity, the deterioration of the natural en
vironment, and national security. The
behaviorist toolkit is not much help
here. Sunstein's account of the future
of government has nothing to say
about unemployment, inequality, or

national security, and its contribution
to environmental protection is limited
to consumer labeling of cars and ap
pliances. Sunstein is right that govern
ment needs to be sensitive to the limits
of its knowledge and understanding
and that intervention needs to be more
flexible and adaptive. But it seems un
likely that many major problems can
be solved without more direct interven
tion and more collective decision-mak
ing than his strategy contemplates. BR
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